One of the casualties in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11 has been global confidence in the Middle East. Sovereign risk -the credit risk assessment to the obligations of central governments -is believed to have increased. In response, credit rating agencies like Moody's and Standard and Poor (S&P) have revised their ratings or placed specific countries on their watch list, a move which normally precedes a credit downgrade. Using data from JP Morgan, Moody's, S&P, and the World Bank, we explain and quantify the variability of sovereign risk in five MENA countries between 1998 and 2002. Our results show that the sovereign risk is sensitive to the variability in the current account, a country's credit rating, and per capita income. Further tests of the impact of September 11 on the region reveal that its sovereign risk has risen by 135 basis points on average. Three immediate implications emerge from our results. Our findings help policymakers in MENA countries (1) better understand how financial markets are pricing their risk, (2) identify the specific risk bins which influence their credit spreads, and (3) suggest mitigation techniques on how their sovereign risk can be reduced.
With these conflicting factors at play, two questions emerge: (1) how did these factors impact the MENA region as a whole and (2) did investor's risk assessments change as evidenced in the sovereign risk premium they require.
Sovereign Debt Analysis in MENA:
Sovereign risk is the risk of the government or government related entity meeting its obligations. Sovereign risk can be divided into three major risk buckets: political, financial, and economic. Sovereign ratings measure the ability and willingness of governments to meet their financial obligations.
A parallel metric to sovereign risk is the country risk rating which measures the potential volatility of local stocks and the potential default of government bonds due to political or financial events. Country risk encompasses both the government (sovereign) and commercial (cooperate, banks, etc) sectors.
The main rating agencies are Standard & Poor (S&P) and Moody's, although latecomers like Fitsch and others are increasingly gaining ground. The two main agencies use somewhat different notations in their ratings. Although they both assign a "triple-A" for debt that is considered to carry the least risk, the rating moves down the alphabet as the risk increases.
Following September 11, the sovereign risk for the MENA region is believed to have increased. As the region's governments borrow in the international bond markets, their credit ratings are gaining significant importance. This is evidenced by rating assignments for new countries that were previously ignored by the agencies (eg. Saudi Arabia). By reducing investor uncertainty about risk exposures, sovereign ratings have enabled several governments to gain access to the Eurobond market. However, the history of credit agencies is fraught with disagreement and controversy over specific rating assignments, primarily because of the difficulty of assessing sovereign risk. In response, financial markets have shown some skepticism towards sovereign ratings when pricing new issues.
This has paved the road for alternative risk assessment methodologies to develop.
Euromoney magazine, for example, publishes country risk assessment bi-annually (in March and September). In addition, many large lenders do not rely exclusively on the rating agencies or Euromoney's assessments but include them as part of their own internal risk assessment methodology.
While the rating agency disagreements over sovereign ratings are quite common, we believe that they stem from the relative inexperience of the agencies in rating sovereign credits and from the difficulty in assessing the political and economic conditions that affect a country's creditworthiness. In principle, the relationship between sovereign ratings and market yields imply that financial market participants recognize inherent disagreements in measuring sovereign credit risk. Indeed, we found that markets generally require much a larger risk premia for sovereign debt issues than for similarly rated corporate bonds 1 . Moreover, the rank-ordering of sovereign risks implied by market yields frequently differs from the rankings assigned by the agencies. We suspect that rating agencies and market participants may rationale the difference in rating to the governments broad ranging powers to 1 Cantor and Packer [1996] found that Sovereign bonds typically trade at higher yields than comparable rated US industrial bonds. They stated that the mean and median sovereign spreads over comparable industrials are 147 and 50 basis point. They also reported that 36 of the 38 sovereign observations are priced at a higher yield than comparable corporates. tax domestic income and the authority to print the local currency, both of which enhance a government's ability to meet its financial obligations. Our observations are confirmed by results from other regions that there is a substantial disagreement between the agencies in their assessments of credit risk for low-quality sovereigns and more consensus at the highquality sovereigns (Cantor and Packer [1996] ).
Middle East and North
Place Tables 1& 2 about The academic literature on sovereign risk is broad and well developed but not for the MENA region --in fact, we could not identify a single study on
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Sovereign Risk applied to any MENA country. For Latin America and Asia, however, the list is long (Erb et. al. 1994 , Hargis et al. 1998 , among many others).
For example, Edwards (1986) estimated the determinants of the spread on Mexican bonds during the early 1980's. Among the significant variables he found were debt/exports and reserve/imports. Boehmer and Meggison (1990) investigated whether the debt crisis in the 1980s was exacerbated by LDCs' insolvency or market illiquidity. Using data on ten countries, they rule out the impact of liquidity risk and conclude that major credit banks should revise their lending practices. Ramcharran (1999) identified that sovereign credit ratings as the primary determinants of loan prices on the secondary market. However, an earlier study by Cantor and Packer (1996) showed that there is significantly more disagreement between rating agencies in their assessments of credit risk for low quality sovereigns than for similar quality US corporate credits. More recently, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) investigated the effect of conflict using terrorist conflict in the Basque Country and found that in the late 1960's, per capita GDP in the Basque country declined about 10 points relative to a synthetic region without terrorism. Chen and Siems (2004) used event study methodology to assess the effects terrorism on global capital market. They examined the US capital markets response to 14 terrorist/military attacks. They reported that US capital market became more resilient than in the past and recover sooner form terrorist attacks than other global markets. Ericsson and Reneby (2004) Our study elaborates on this literature in two directions: we (1) tie in the debt indicator variables directly to the yield spread on Eurobonds issued by 5
MENA countries, and (2) test whether the events of September 11 has created a shift in risk perception across markets. This test is critical if one wants to challenge any rating change by the agencies. maturity, and x it is a vector of 5 independent variables explained above. The dummy variable technique will determine if September 11 has produced a fundamental shift in the sensitivity of sovereign risk to each of the independent variables we include. Some of the independent variables will vary over time and across sections, whereas other will only vary across sections. While the error terms are serially correlated for k > l, they are independent of the regressors (ie.
Proposed Data and Methodology
. The residual covariance matrix for this set of equations is given by:
Results and Discussion:
The Sovereign Spread measures the yield differential between a country's sovereign bond and a US Treasury security of comparable maturity.
As such, the spread provides a direct (and perhaps the best available) market assessment of the sovereign risk of a country. The advantages of using the Sovereign Spread to measure a country's sovereign risk are several: (1) the yields on sovereign bonds are quoted daily thereby providing a frequent update of a country's risk situation; (2) unlike the agencies' subjective credit assignments, the sovereign spreads are determined by the market and therefore more objective; and (3) just as stock prices impute the most efficient information of a company, the yield on sovereign bonds reflects the most direct available market assessment of a country's sovereign risk.
Place table 3 about here Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for sovereign spreads (in bp), Gross National Income (Atlas Method, in US $), Current Account (as % of GDP) and
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Monthly Equity Returns for each of the five MENA countries we investigated 3 .
Turkey has the largest sovereign spread, but Lebanon's is the most volatile during more than the 60 quarters of observation. In terms of stock market risk, Turkey is the most volatile equity market, and Morocco's had the least return fluctuation.
Place table 4 about here Table 4 reports the results of the panel data estimation technique. In terms of sovereign risk, it is important to look at the results across two dimensions:
overtime and across countries. For example, the coefficient of the credit rating variable shows the impact in basis points of a one-notch change in credit rating.
The negative sign indicates that a rating upgrade reduces a country's sovereign spread. Specifically, if the region's rating improves one level, the sovereign spreads are expected to tighten by ≈ 40 bp. How useful is this number? When combined with a target interest rate at which a country desires to borrow, this result will help determine the incremental increase (or decrease) in interest cost a country expect to pay (save) in the event their credit rating drops (improves). For a policymaker, this result provides a direct measurable target towards which a borrowing country can aim.
Place table 5 about here
Turning to the economic variables, all the income coefficients are negative, as expected, with a strong influence on sovereign risk (their p-value is < 1%). In terms of strength, Morocco's sovereign spread is most influenced by a change in 3 Sovereign spreads are available on two other countries: Algeria and Tunisia. Algeria was dropped from the analysis because its ratings were sporadic apparently due to the civil strife and which presented a special case. The Sovereign Spreads for Tunisia began being quoted on the market after September 11 and therefore the data is not relevant for this study. Our results also provide a test of the impact of September 11 on sovereign spreads. The coefficient of the dummy variable is positive and highly significant.
The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that the marginal impact of September 11 on sovereign spreads for these countries has been to the tune of 135 bp. Of course, the total change in the sovereign spread is far greater, however not all that change is attributed to September 11 and can be explained away by specific changes in the regions' economic conditions. For example, the average sovereign and where the rate may be locked. However, the effect of the higher risk premium on sovereign debt is limited due to its relatively small size. From table 7, based on the outstanding value of the region's sovereign debt ($17.5 b) and its average life (7.1 years), a 135 bp translates into ≈ $1.67 b in additional interest cost, the bulk of which was borne by Turkey.
Conclusion:
Sovereign ratings measure the ability and willingness of governments or government related entities to honor their financial obligations. The three major components are political risk, financial risk and economic risk. A parallel measure to sovereign risk is the country risk rating which assesses 
